Assrnacr This article is an attempt at rethinking participatory development (po) in terms of empire, undertaking a postcolonial and psychoanalytic reading. Postcolonialism helps point out that our discursive constructions of the Third World say more about us than the Third World; while psychoanalysis helps uncover the desires we invest in the Other. Thus, to the question, 'why do neo-imperial and inegalitarian relationships pervade po?', the article answers, 'because even as PD promotes the Other's empowerment, it hinges crucially on our complicity and desire'; and'because disavowing such complicity and desire is a technology of power'. The argument, in other words, is that complicity and desire are written into PD, making it prone to an exclusionary, Western-centric and inegalitarian politics. The article concludes with possibilities for confronting our complicities and desires through po's radicalisation.
I write'our'in an eflort at self-implication: it seems to me that, whether we are critics or advocates of pD, we are implicated in it. As development workers and researchers, as intellectuals and academics, we may make (at least a part of) our careers off it. As Westerners, some of our sociocultural values and practices may inform Po (as we shall see below). As members of Western(ised) elites participating in the global capitalist economy, we may be direct or indirect contributors (as taxpayers, consumers, voters) to those national or transnational institutions that'invest' in pn. True, there are different degrees of contamination here; but my point is that not owning up to the range of these complicities ensures the reproduction of inequality and empire.
Complicity and desire
To begin the task of excavating complicity and desire from the depths of pD, I take my cue from Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak and Slavoj ZlLek. Said's significant contribution, of course, is showing the Orient to be a discursive construct (Said, 1978 has less to do with the Orient than it does with "our" world' (1918: l2) .
Much of Spivak's work is an extension of this insight. She cautions that, in speaking about the Other, we often disavow our own role in the representational process, as though we are transparent and neutral relays (Spivak, 1988) . Like Said, she thus believes that it is important that we turn our anthropological gaze upon ourselves before we investigate the Other. Her insinuation for us (as academics, researchers or development workers) is that our representations about, or on behalf of, the Third World are a function of our geopolitical and institutional positioning (Kapoor, 2004b 'Real' (ZiLek,1989: 69; 1999: 74) . Reality is what we (mistakenly) take to be wholeness or harmony, while the Real denotes the impossibility of wholeness, a fundamental lack that troubles any attempt at closure and consistency. For Zi\ek, from the moment we enter into the world of language, reality is where we escape to avoid the Real (1989: 45,47) . We desire and enjoy fullness (eg the perfect car, pure love, an ideal democracy), and find it difficult to come to terms with incompleteness (that is written into the very structure of language), and so we construct a fantasy world. Desire thus involves the misrecognition of fullness, and fantasy is 'the support that gives consistency to what we call "reality"' (1989: 44) . While fantasy is an individualised or internalised psychic phenomenon, ideology interpellates us at the level of the social, from the outside. Like fantasy, it is a framework that forecloses the Real in order to make reality smooth and consistent. But ZlZet< is adamant that ideology is not a mask or veil covering the 'real' situation, a reality behind reality: it is 'not simply a "false consciousness", an illusory representation of reality, it is rather this reality itself which is already to be conceived as "ideological"' (1989: 2l) .In this sense, for ZiL,ek, ideology is externalised and materialised: it is built into our sociopolitical practices and institutions.
But if it surrounds us and interpellates us, how do we go about distancing ourselves from it, critiquing it? Not through the development of some superconsciousness, since, as just pointed out, there is no 'higher' ground from which to distinguish 'true' from 'false' reality. And (Henkel & Stirrat, 2001: 175) . His writings are strewn with moral exhortations, encouraging the pne facilitator to shed hierarchical thinking and Westernised ways (1994 and Westernised ways ( : 1256 . Like the ascetic or monk who has overcome worldly attachments, the facilitator is expected to develop astringent powers (more on this below) and, as Paul Francis puts it, enact 'an exorcism, of sorts, of phantoms of "conventional" development practice' (Francis,2001: 80 (Chambers, 1994 (Chambers, : 1253 (Chambers, , 1256 There is thus a wave of political dissatisfaction and a demand for a more participatory democracy that has entered our liberal democratic culture, and in turn, the consciousness of the development intelligentsia.
Of course, such frustrations and demands are channelled in various ways (eg through public protest), but some of them may be psychically transferred through our development work. PD Zitek helps tease out a further dimension of such transference via his discussion on 'canned laughter' (ie simulated audience laughter, usually on television comedy programmes). For him, the significance of canned laughter lies not in reminding us when to laugh, but in the fact that the Other-embodied in the television set-is relieving us even of our duty to Iaugh-is laughing instead of us. So even if, tired from a hard day's stupid work, all evening we did nothing but gaze drowsily into the television screen, we can say afterwards that objectively, through the medium of the other, we had a really good time (1989: 35). Seen in this light, pD is a kind of canned laughter: it helps us work through our political idealism and discontent, relieving us from participating 'over here' and enabling us to partake vicariously through the other's participation 'over there'. We manage the process (and get the glory), they participate (as directed by us), and at the end of the programme, we come away feeling satlated as spectator-participants.
Zil.ek interprets this phenomenon as symptomatic of 'commodity fetishism' under late capitalism: human relationships take on the form of relations between things, so that we increasingly interact with one another in abstract, vicarious and alienated ways (1989: 34-35 (Kelsall & Mercer, 2003: 302;  cf Mosse, 1994: 508 Ferguson, 1990 (Mosse, 2001:20-21, 17) .In another instance Mosse reports that some community members often shy away from giving their personal opinions at PRA gatherings, preferring instead to provide the 'official story'. Women participants, in particular, are liable to speak guardedly, or indeed to let their husbands speak for them, thereby responding to patriarchal and sociocultural taboos against speaking frankly in public (Mosse, 1994: 508, 514-515). (Makuwira,2004: 8 (utrc) especially, debt relief is contingent upon a poverty reduction strategy (rns), which in turn requires local 'ownership' (World Bank, 2003; 2000: 253 (Roy, 2004: 56 (Foucault, 1984: 343) We can save democracy only by taking into qccount its own impossibility.lZi\ek, 7989: 6, emphasis in the original)
My point is not that po is bad, but that it is dangerous. The reason is that it is fundamentally adulterated, so that along with its medicine comes its poison (cf Parfitt, 2004: 554-555 This is not to announce the end of empire building through ro; but it is to say that even imperial power can be (and is) resisted and redeployed. Power, no matter whether it is hegemonic or authoritarian, is always hybridised (or haunted by the Real), making its triumphalism shaky and its victories temporary. Thus PD's gaze may well be constrictive, but there is nothing to prevent its subjects from returning a menacing glare or a mocking glance (Bhabha, 1994: 3 This is Habermas's answer to the problem: he advocates an 'ideal speech situation', that is, a set of fair, inter-subjective rules and procedures governing public deliberation (cf Kapoor,2002a 7 Although, as the next section argues, regarding them as pawns does not necessarily mean they will conform to our expectations. 8 I refer here to 'us' as change agents within academic or development institutions. It is, in many ways, these change agents to whom this article is primarily addressed. It is we who can exploit the institutional possibilities that I reler to in the first three sections above. If so, we may be able to take advantage of po's instabilities and contradictions (perhaps in collaboration with po's subjects). For example, we could push for our own institutions to face up to such contradictions and call for the extension and deepening of participation in decision making both 'inside' and 'outside' these institutions.
